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Demons, Evil, and Liminality  
in Cappadocian Theology
MORWENNA LUDLOW
Despite the growing literature on demons in late antiquity, there has been no 
detailed study of demons in Cappadocian theology. This paper argues that 
demons occupy a liminal place in Cappadocian cosmology: demons were 
personal, rational beings, who were created good, fell from their original state, 
and became locked into an irreversible habit of willing evil, which contra-
dicted but parasitically co-existed with their nature as part of God’s good 
creation. This liminal status explains demons’ use in Cappadocian theology 
not only to illustrate the power and nature of evil, but also as an exaggerated 
representation of humans’ own condition: especially in preaching and hagi-
ography, demons served to highlight the way in which human sin contradicts 
humans’ original creation and to warn humans against the possibilities of 
locking themselves into a permanent habit of sin.
Demons have increasingly become the subject of scholarly investigation 
for those interested in late antique religion and, in this essay, I wish to 
extend the inquiry to Cappadocian theology. Because of the extent of the 
Cappadocians’ writings and because they write about demons in various 
contexts (such as cosmology, eschatology, and pastoral theology) the Cap-
padocians’ works offer a valuable resource for the deeper understanding 
of this topic. Nevertheless, this aspect of their theology has not received 
very much detailed attention—perhaps because it has not coincided with 
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the dominant directions of research on the Cappadocians and perhaps 
also because demonology has been felt to be difficult to reconcile with the 
picture of Basil and the two Gregories as sophisticated, urban writers.1 
Most readers of their works will have noticed that the Cappadocians wrote 
about the devil and demons; indeed, the specific characteristics of demons 
meant that “demonic” language played a role in the Cappadocians’ rhe-
torical construction of their world, particularly with regard to how they 
portrayed their enemies. But the question is: does such language constitute 
merely a rhetorical construction or does it reflect a fundamental belief in 
the demonic? If so, what is this belief? What theological implications did it 
have, for example, for their doctrine of creation and understanding of evil?
This article will try to show not only that the Cappadocian fathers did 
believe in demons, but also that this belief was an integral part of their doc-
trinal system and played an important role in their pastoral and polemical 
theology. The discussion will begin with an analysis of the Cappadocians’ 
cosmology and then proceed to an examination of the Cappadocians’ use of 
demons in the personal and political spheres. Although the Cappadocians 
often express themselves in rhetorical, narrative, poetic, or other literary 
forms, I hope to show that “demonic” language cannot be reduced to a 
mere literary trope. I will argue that their thoughts about demons offer 
some interesting perspectives on the concept of liminality—a concept that 
has already been used very effectively to think about late antique concepts 
of the demonic, although not with specific reference to the Cappadocians.2
DEMONS IN CAPPADOCIAN COSMOLOGY
On a first reading, demons appear much less vividly in the writings of the 
Cappadocian fathers than they do, for instance, in the works arising out 
of Egyptian monasticism. Indeed, it might be tempting to assume from 
1. Dayna Kalleres, “Demons and Divine Illumination: A Consideration of Eight 
Prayers by Gregory of Nazianzus,” VC 61 (2007): 157–88, remarks à propos of 
Gregory of Nazianzus that, “in light of Gregory’s two accepted roles as rhetor and 
as theologian, it is with little surprise that any evidence suggesting the Cappadocian’s 
involvement with anti-demonic incantations has been downplayed” (160). One can 
appropriately apply to the other two Cappadocians her comment that scholars read-
ing Nazianzen have tended to focus on either theology (“Trinitarian doctrine or . . . 
his invocation of Platonic conceptualities filtered through an Origenist system”) or 
the writer’s “self-identification as a member of the educated elite” (160 n.9).
2. See especially Rebecca Lyman, “2002 NAPS Presidential Address: Hellenism 
and Heresy,” JECS 11 (2009): 209–22; Annette Yoshiko Reed, “The Trickery of the 
Fallen Angels and the Demonic Mimesis of the Divine: Aetiology, Demonology, and 
Polemics in the Writings of Justin Martyr,” JECS 12 (2004): 141–71.
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3. See Basil, Ep. 1.28; also, Ep. 5 to Nectarius and Ep. 6 to Nectarius’s wife, respec-
tively, at the death of their son; cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep. 195.6. 
4. On the convention in pagan epitaphs of attributing death to “the jealous one,” 
see G. Bartelink, “BASKANOS designation de Satan et démons chez les auteurs chré-
tiens,” OCP 49 (1983): 399–401, noting how Gregory of Nazianzus adapted the theme.
5. Robert C. Gregg, Consolation Philosophy: Greek and Christian Paideia in Basil 
and the Two Gregories, Patristic Monograph Series 3 (Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia 
Patristic Foundation, 1975), 150–51.
6. Basil, Hom. in Ps. (PG 29:280); Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 3 (ed. Werner Jaeger, 
Gregorius Nyssenus. Contra Eunomium liber III, Gregorii Nysseni Opera [Leiden: 
Brill, 1960], 55). 
7. See Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (London: Faber, 1967), 41: 
“Augustine grew up in an age when men thought that they shared the physical world 
with malevolent demons. They felt this quite as intensely as we feel the presence of 
myriads of dangerous bacteria.” See also Peter Brown, The Cult of the Saints (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 114–15.
some of the Cappadocians’ writings that, for these sophisticated, highly 
educated men, a “demon” was merely a figure of speech. Thus, when Basil 
personifies misfortune as a demon in his letters, it is hard to believe that he 
really thought that a demon directly caused so minor an event as his failing 
to meet one of his correspondents or so major an event as the death of a 
friend’s son.3 His comments seem merely to be an artful revivification of 
the dead metaphor in Greek which, if read literally, would attribute both 
good fortune (εὐδαιμονία) and bad fortune (κακοδαιμονία) to the influence 
of a δαίμων, a divine or quasi-divine power.4 As Robert Gregg remarks in 
his sensitive account of the consolatio form in the Cappadocians’ writ-
ings, the invocation of demons as the cause of bad fortune “attests more 
to the power of the genre’s conventions that it does to an intellectual lapse 
on [their] part.”5 Furthermore, the Cappadocians refer to both mental ill-
ness and epilepsy (“the demonic disease”) as demonic, without appearing 
to commit themselves necessarily to the direct (or sole) causation of these 
conditions by a demon.6
However, it would be incorrect to conclude from such examples that 
the Cappadocians had no belief in demons—that is, a belief in autono-
mous rational beings who possessed a will that was used for bad purposes 
and who perhaps had a kind of body, albeit a body unlike that of any 
other creature. Such a belief would not be uncharacteristic of the age in 
which they lived. Peter Brown’s work on “popular” piety has shown the 
prevalence of the belief in demons in late antiquity and the inaccuracy 
of assuming that such a belief was merely the preserve of those of lower 
social status.7 Indeed, he argues that one reason for Christianity’s success 
was, in effect, that it took a belief in demons seriously and offered to do 
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8. Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1971), 54.
9. See, e.g., David Brakke, Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Com-
bat in Early Christianity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 9–11.
10. See Brakke, Demons, 49; Kevin Corrigan, Evagrius and Gregory: Mind, Soul 
and Body in the 4th Century (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 114, discusses the Cap-
padocians’ concept of demons only in passing, but highlights many other resonances 
between Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius’s thought.
11. Michael Dols, “Insanity in Byzantine and Islamic Medicine,” DOP 38 (1984): 
145, esp. n. 79, citing Owsei Temkin, The Falling Sickness, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 97–98.
12. Dols, “Insanity,” 145; see also Vivian Nutton, “From Galen to Alexander, 
Aspects of Medicine and Medical Practice in Late Antiquity,” DOP 38 (1984): 9, 
who notes that how Christianity “introduced, or re-introduced, into medicine the 
idea of demons and demoniac possession. . . . In late antiquity, medical men were 
willing to consider the intervention of demons and spirits as a cause of disease, and 
disease as some form of divine punishment for sins, far more openly than they had 
done in the time of Galen.”
13. Gregg, Consolation Philosophy, 151: “Satanic powers were lively realities to 
the patristic church, and it was no difficult work for Christian thinkers to recostume 
the likes of ὁ φθόνος for their own cosmological dramas. Specifically, the cursings of 
an envious spirit or malicious demon would have a clear authenticity in the thought 
of those responsive to the biblical tradition, even if their utterances retained a dis-
tinct Hellenic flavor.”
something about them.8 Recent research has shown that a belief in demons 
was by no means restricted to the undereducated, lower-class monks in 
the Egyptian monastic communities.9 There is no reason to suppose that 
the same argument could not apply to the monasteries and cities of Cap-
padocia (after all, Evagrius, one of the major architects of eastern Chris-
tian beliefs about demons, was profoundly influenced by both Basil and 
Gregory of Nazianzus).10 Furthermore, medical historians have noted 
how late antique medicine seems to have wavered between the Galenic 
interpretation of mental illness or epilepsy as an imbalance in the humors 
and an interpretation that attributed the conditions to demons. Occasion-
ally, doctors adopted a compromise, hypothesizing that demons exploited 
weakness in their victims by entering those whose humoral balance was 
already disturbed.11 In other words, in late antiquity it was not the elite 
doctors who took a purely naturalistic, Galenic line and the superstitious 
patients who spoke of demons: rather, there was increasingly “no clear-
cut division between religious and naturalistic healing in late antiquity.”12 
Even Robert Gregg, whose comments on Cappadocian references to the 
demonic were noted above, warns that to regard talk of demons as merely 
a nod to a literary convention would be to ignore “the ‘collapsibility’ of 
Greek and Jewish-Christian demonologies into one another.”13
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14. See especially Origen, Princ. 1.4–8, 2.9–10, 3.2. 
15. On this theme in the fathers, see Gregory A. Smith, “How Thin is a Demon?,” 
JECS 16 (2008): 479–512; with regard to Evagrius, see Columba Stewart, “Imageless 
Prayer and the Theological Vision of Evagrius Ponticus,” JECS 9 (2001): 176 n. 14: 
beings’ “bodily compositions are predominantly fire (angels), earth (humans), and air 
(demons)”—but air (πνεῦμα) is not immaterial. Some statements from the Cappado-
cians seem to suggest that demons have light, airy bodies, such as Gregory of Nazian-
zus, Carm. 1.1.7.60 (ed. Claudio Moreschini and trans. D. A. Sykes, St. Gregory of 
Nazianzus: Poemata Arcana [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997], 30–31): “Although of 
light composition, he yet slipped to this lower earth” (Καὶ κοῦφός περ ἐὼν χθαμαλὴν 
ἐπὶ γαῖαν ὄλισθεν). But some modern authorities think that at least Basil and Gregory 
of Nyssa denied that demons had bodies: see A. Kallis, “Geister (Dämonen); C. II. 
Griechische Väter,” in RAC 9, ed. Theodor Klauser et al. (Stuttgart: Anton Hierse-
mann, 1976), 703–4. This issue requires further research, not least on the question 
of what was meant by “a body”/“embodiment.”
16. See Gregory of Nyssa, Anim. et res. (PG 46:72). 
17. Gregory of Nazianzus, Carm. 1.1.7.68–69, 73–77 (trans. Peter Gilbert, On God 
and Man: The Theological Poetry of Saint Gregory Nazianzus [Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001], 60). It is possible, although not entirely clear, that 
the phrase “there sprang from them evil beings on earth” refers to the fallen angels’ 
coupling with the daughters of men to produce an unnatural “in between” race; if so, 
Prima facie, then, it seems possible, even likely, that the Cappadocians 
believed in demons. This hypothesis is supported by a closer look at their 
comments about cosmology. As the Cappadocians have left no sustained 
prose discussion of the place of demons in their theology, it is a case of 
patching together clues from various sources. However, the general cosmo-
logical picture that I will draw in this section is, I will argue, supported by 
the Cappadocians’ more specific comments about demons with regard to 
personal human behavior, which I will analyze in later parts of this article. 
The Cappadocians appear to have followed the basic pattern of belief 
about evil spirits that had been set out by Origen (most notably in his 
On First Principles).14 According to this belief, God created two kinds of 
rational being: humans and angels. Both are embodied, although angels 
(and thus demons) seem to have a different, finer kind of embodiment than 
humans.15 One of the angels, Satan, fell and dragged others with him, set-
ting in train a race of fallen angels, the demons, who not only epitomized 
sin, but plagued human beings, encouraging them to follow them in sin-
fulness.16 As Gregory of Nazianzus writes,
[Satan] did not slip alone, but after arrogance destroyed him / there fell 
with him a multitude, as many as he’d schooled in evil. . . . / Therefore 
there sprang from them evil beings on earth, / demons, minions to the 
murderous king of evil: / languors, shades, ill-boding phantasms of the 
night, / liars and revilers, instructors in sin, / bamboozlers, souses, seducers, 
party-animals.17
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Gregory would be following a Christian re-reading of “The Myth of the  Watchers” 
in 1 Enoch 7, itself an interpretation of Gen 6.1–4. On earlier Christian use of this 
myth, see Reed, “The Trickery of the Fallen Angels,” 141–71.
18. See Gregory of Nyssa, Res. 4 (GNO 9:311); hom. in Cant. (GNO 6:166, 421), 
Gregory of Nazianzus, Carm. 1.1.7.70.
19. See Basil, Hex. 6.1.34–38. 
20. Gregory Nyssa, Res. 1 (GNO 9:298–303), and Res. 4 (GNO 9:311). See also 
Basil, Eun. 2.27 (PG 29:636A–B).
21. On Exodus, see Gregory of Nyssa, V. Mos., passim; on the Psalms, Gregory 
of Nyssa, Ps. titt. (GNO 5:126, 140); Basil, Hom. in Ps. (PG 29:325, 416–17, 476); 
Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. in Cant. (GNO 6:141–42, 143, 166, 421).
22. Gregory of Nyssa, Anim. et res. (PG 46:69–72; trans. NPNF2 5:444).
23. See, e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, Anim. et res. (PG 46:72). For two opposing inter-
pretations of Nyssen’s views, see Giulio Maspero, La Trinità et l’uomo (Rome: Città 
Nuova, 2004), 176–200, and Morwenna Ludlow, Universal Salvation: Eschatology 
in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2000), 78–85. 
In this cosmology, although Satan is the commander of the demons’ army18 
and is sometimes seen as giving rise to a race of demons, he is no sense 
their creator (just as Adam was held to be the father of the human race, 
but not its creator). The Cappadocians emphasize firmly that Satan is 
part of God’s creation and not a rival creative power to God, although, 
as we shall see, there were other senses in which Satan and his demons 
were rivals of God.19 
Because they hold that demons and Satan alike were created by God, 
the Cappadocians believe that these evil beings are ultimately under God’s 
power. Although they admit that demons currently have some power on 
earth (a theme to which we will return), they assert that Christ’s death 
on the cross was both the means of their defeat and a sign of their final, 
eschatological capitulation to God, a theme described with particular vivid-
ness in Gregory of Nyssa’s Easter Sermons.20 The Cappadocians believe 
that Scripture refers frequently to God’s defeat of demonic powers, not 
only in the book of Revelation, but also—more elliptically—in books like 
Exodus, the Psalms, and even the Song of Songs.21 With regard to the New 
Testa ment, Gregory of Nyssa takes Phil 2.10–11 to declare that all rational 
beings will eventually bow before the name of Jesus—that is, angels “in 
heaven,” humans “on earth,” and demons “under the earth.”22 
The three Cappadocian fathers agree that eventually all demons will 
capitulate to God, but there are different nuances to their understanding of 
God’s eschatological victory: Gregory of Nyssa (following Origen’s univer-
salism) emphasizes a final harmony in which all rational creation praises 
God, a view which clearly implies, even if it does not explicitly state, that 
in the end even demons will be transformed and redeemed.23 Basil, who 
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24. Basil, Hom. in Ps. (PG 29:369; trans. A. C. Way, Saint Basil: Exegetic Homi-
lies, FC 46 [Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963], 263).
25. Basil, Hom. in Ps. (PG 29:232–33; trans. Way, 167–68): “The noble athletes 
of God, who have wrestled with invisible enemies their whole life, after they reach 
the end of life, are examined by the ‘prince of the world.’ You may learn this from 
the Lord himself who said concerning the time of his passion, ‘Now the prince of the 
world is coming, and in me he will have nothing’ (John 14:30). He who had com-
mitted no sin said that he had nothing.” This passage is cited by Nicholas Constas, 
“‘To Sleep, Perchance to Dream’: The Middle State of Souls in Patristic and Byzantine 
Literature,” DOP 55 (2001): 105.
26. Gregory of Nazianzus, Carm. 1.1.6.88–95 (trans. Sykes, 33).
rejects Origen’s universalistic eschatology and whose theology often has 
a sterner edge, seems to think that, far from being reconciled with God, 
angry demons will be used by God at the eschaton as the agents of his 
eternal wrath. Thus he declares that, at the “fearful and intolerable tribu-
nal of Christ,” the wicked are accompanied by “certain horrible and dark 
angels . . . flashing fire from their eyes and breathing fire because of the 
bitterness of their wills, and with a countenance like the night because of 
their dejection and hatred of man.”24 Basil also suggests that souls will be 
examined by Satan himself.25 Gregory of Nazianzus raises both the pos-
sibility that demons give humans something to strive against in this life so 
that humans might be purified and the suggestion that demons are God’s 
agents of punishment in hell:
[Christ] provoked a dreadful struggle between Lucifer and humanity, that 
he might incur further shame, inasmuch as he was warring against a weaker 
opponent, whereas his human adversaries, striving through the exercise 
of goodness, might gain their everlasting glory, being purified like gold in 
the melting-pots of life. Perhaps also might Lucifer, for all his stubborn 
resistance, hereafter pay his penalty, his substance consumed, when there is 
requital by fire, though indeed he was to a great degree subdued before in 
the persons of his harried minions.26 
Despite these differences, all three Cappadocians believe that God has ulti-
mate power over demons. Their writings convey not so much a desire for 
the victory of one power (God) over another, rival power (the devil and 
his demons), but rather a confidence that, in the end, God will order all 
things as God wills, precisely because God created all things and because 
all things—including demons—derive their being and power from God. 
Despite this ultimate submission of all things to God, the Cappadocians 
agree that demons still have a real influence on the world, even after the 
victory of the cross. Gregory of Nazianzus assures his reader that “had 
he willed it, [Christ] could have annihilated Lucifer immediately,” even 
though, in fact, the devil has been permitted to enter a “struggle” with his 
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27. Gregory of Nazianzus, Carm. 1.1.6.84–85 (trans. Sykes, 33).
28. See Alden A. Mosshammer, “Evil,” in The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of 
Nyssa, ed. L. F. Mateo-Seco and G. Maspero, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 
99 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 330, for a similar idea in Gregory of Nyssa with regard to 
the gradual eradication of evil.
29. Gregory of Nazianzus, Carm. 1.1.6.88–95 (trans. Sykes, 33); Kallis, “Geister 
(Dämonen),” 704, citing Basil, Hom. 9.9 (PG 31:352A). 
30. Kallis, “Geister (Dämonen),” 701, citing Basil, Hom. 9.4 (PG 31:341B), and 
Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 39.7 (PG 36:341B). 
31. Kallis, “Geister (Dämonen),” 701, citing Basil, Hom. 9.8 (PG 31:345D).
32. See Vasiliki Limberis, “The Eyes Infected by Evil: Basil of Caesarea’s Homily, 
On Envy,” HTR 84 (1991): 167.
“human adversaries.”27 His comment, quoted above, that the devil was 
“to a great degree subdued before in the persons of his harried minions,” 
perhaps also suggests the idea that this age is an interim period between a 
decisive battle (the crucifixion and resurrection) and the final completion 
of the demons’ defeat.28 The complicated imagery and the book of Revela-
tion’s narrative might be interpreted to support such an idea (even though 
the Cappadocians, like Origen, rejected strict millenarian interpretations).
The Cappadocians seem to think it is impossible, however, for humans 
to know exactly why God should have allowed the existence of evil even 
after the victory of Christ’s resurrection: in the extract above, Nazianzen 
suggests that God uses demons as a means of enabling humans to “gain 
their everlasting glory” through striving against temptation; Basil com-
ments that demons’ power in this world is an effect of the restriction of their 
power to this world because of their exclusion from heaven.29 But neither 
is presented as a definitive answer. In fact, the general idea that evil is for 
some reason expressly permitted by God is for the Cappadocians not an 
idle speculation but a response to the real problem of humans’ continued 
experience of evil in the world. It is, that is, a second stage of their theo-
dicy. They first explain the existence of evil in a good world created by 
God by the idea that both demons and humans fell away from the God by 
their own free will.30 After the fall, humans continued to sin, although they 
could choose good instead of evil. The assumption of the Cappadocians’ 
cosmology, however, appears to be that demons have locked themselves 
into a habit of vice, such that they cannot choose the good.31 Second, the 
Cappadocians appear to explain the continued existence of evil in the world 
after the resurrection by the fact that even though they cannot choose the 
good, God has allowed demons the freedom to carry out their evil will.32 
(They might thus be seen to possess a kind of freedom of action, if not a 
genuine freedom of will.) Demons make use of this relative and restricted 
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33. Basil, Hom. 11 (PG 31:380; trans. M. Monica Wagner, Saint Basil: Ascetical 
Works, FC 9 [Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1950], 470).
34. See the method employed by Smith, “How Thin Is a Demon?,” 482–83: “In 
the discussion below this serves as a kind of methodological point of departure: when 
reading or thinking about ancient demons, begin by taking what is said about their 
nature and activity as literally, as physically, as possible. Of course, even a perfectly 
sensible literal reading need not exclude metaphor; quite the contrary, but the reverse 
is truer still, and easier to forget.”
35. Mosshammer, “Evil,” 326–27, citing Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. in Eccl. (GNO 
5:406–7); Virg. (GNO 8/1:299); Beat. (GNO 7/2:129); Basil, Hex. (PG 29:37C–D). 
36. Mosshammer, “Evil,” 327, citing Gregory of Nyssa, Or. catech. (GNO 3/4:24ff), 
which appears to be using the concept of στέρησις from Aristotle, Categories 12A.
37. Mosshammer, “Evil,” 328, citing Gregory of Nyssa, Pss. titt. (GNO 5:155); 
Hom. in Eccl. (GNO 5:384). Base metal: see Hom. in 1 Cor. 15:28 (GNO 3/2:13–14).
freedom to abuse human freedom: as Basil puts it, “the demons, who are 
enemies of all that is good, use for their own ends such [human] free acts 
as they find congenial to their wishes.”33 Hence, evil continues to exist 
after the resurrection because God allows demons to continue to will evil 
and humans to cooperate with demons in carrying evil deeds out.
Is it mentally possible to bracket out all references to “demons” (i.e. 
autonomous rational individuals) in Cappadocian cosmology and to 
replace them with references to “forces of evil”? In the first place, simplic-
ity argues for the assumption that Cappadocians did mean demons when 
they wrote about “demons.”34 Furthermore, although it might be difficult 
to understand why God should allow demons a free rein even after the 
resurrection, at least the Cappadocians could explain this phenomenon 
in terms of God continuing to allow rational beings a limited exercise of 
their freedom. But replacing talk of demons by talk of impersonal “forces 
of evil” would raise problems for their theodicy: if Jesus really defeated 
the “forces of evil” on the cross, what would evil be doing still working 
in the world? More fundamentally, what would that evil be?
Both Gregory of Nyssa and Basil agree that evil does not exist as an inde-
pendent force or power in the universe; rather, evil is a characteristic of a 
rational being’s choice to turn against God. To the extent that it exists, it 
exists in the will that chose it.35 This is an adaptation of a negative theory 
of evil—the idea that, metaphysically speaking, evil has no existence in 
itself but exists only insofar as it is a privation of the good.36 Since Gregory 
of Nyssa, for example, thinks of evil “as a spurious existence clinging to 
being in dependence on the powers of the created will,” he describes evil 
in humans with various metaphors that suggest that evil is parasitic on 
human nature, “a false growth, rootless and unsown,” or “an intestinal 
parasite,” or a corrupting element which has tainted precious metal.37 But 
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38. Although I concede that some of his metaphors do give that impression; see, 
notably, Hom. opif. (PG 44:201B–C). On this passage, see Mosshammer, “Evil,” 329, 
and Ludlow, Universal Salvation, 88.
39. Mosshammer, “Evil,” 328.
40. Gregory of Nyssa, Perf. (GNO 8/1:180).
41. Gregory of Nyssa, Perf. (GNO 8/1:180).
human nature is in itself a part of God’s good creation, so if evil exists as 
a result of human willing, then it exists only insofar as it parasitic on or 
a privation of something that is good. Evil is evil precisely in that it is a 
perversion of that which is good.
Although this is an adaptation of the idea of evil as the privation of 
good, one must be very careful how one understands it. It appears not to 
be the case (for Gregory of Nyssa at least) that evil is thought of in strictly 
quantitative terms.38 Gregory seems not to think that human beings start 
off one hundred percent good, and that for each percentage point of evil 
they allow to exist in their wills, they become correspondingly one per-
cent less good. Rather, his metaphors suggest a more complex notion, by 
which the will is conceived as a receptacle that “contains” any evil it com-
mits.39 In this view, evil is a privation of the good that the will could have 
done and it corrupts the workings of the will so that it is a privation of 
the good the will should do in the future; but it is not possible to set out 
an account in which each unit of evil cancels out a unit of good. Rather, 
Gregory’s point seems to be that the evil co-exists with the potential of 
the soul for good—just as the parasite co-exists with its host, or the base 
metal adds corrupting matter to, but takes nothing away from, silver or 
gold. In another particularly vivid series of images in his work On Per-
fection, Gregory writes that “the person containing each of the opposites 
[light and darkness] becomes an enemy to himself, being divided in two 
ways between virtue and evil (διχῇ μερισθεὶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν), and 
he sets up an antagonistic battle line within himself.”40 This is because, 
following Paul in 2 Cor 6.14, Gregory asserts that there can be nothing in 
common (no κοινωνία) between light and darkness: there is a “distinct and 
irreconcilable contradiction” (ἄμικτος καὶ ἀμεσίτευτός ἐστιν ἡ ἐναντίωσις) 
between them; there is “an opposition of the parts drawn up against each 
other” (τῇ τῶν ἀντιστοιχούντων ἀλλήοις ἐναντιότητι); it is “impossible and 
inconsistent” (ἀμήχανος καὶ ἀσύμβατος) for there to be κοινωνία between 
them.41 The co-existence of evil with good does not make evil any less 
evil (as it would if good and evil were assessed quantitatively), but makes 
it more evil. Gregory admits—in fact, he emphatically asserts—that the 
co-existence of good and evil is a paradox, but his point seems to be that 
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it is precisely the shock of that co-existence that makes evil evil: it ought 
not to be.42 To put it another way, there is co-existence, but not κοινωνία 
between good and evil in the human soul.
By extension from these reflections in humans, one can surmise that the 
Cappadocians thought that evil came to exist in demons’ wills when they 
chose to oppose God. Since each being was originally created good, evil 
is a “fall” of a rational will away from God. All the Cappadocians agree 
that demons are either good angels who fell or are the offspring of a good 
angel who fell.43 In other words, the Cappadocians did not construe evil as 
a rival metaphysical power to God, a power that has existence in and of 
itself, which to the Cappadocians would entail a Marcionite/Manichaean 
view of the universe. Rather, by seeing evil as a characteristic of the choices 
of rational beings—both demons and humans—the Cappadocians offer an 
explanation for the continued imperfection of the world, without denying 
divine love or power.
But an interesting outcome of this position is that, in one sense, demons 
are not completely evil, because evil needs some good in which to exist. 
Even though their wills are utterly evil because they are absolutely turned 
against God, there is a sense that these wills exist only insofar as they are 
parasitic on a rational nature, which is in a minimal sense good (because 
it is created and because it exists). Thus, I suggest, for the Cappadocians, 
demons occupy a liminal space: their wills are utterly opposed to God and 
thus evil, and yet these wills exist in a nature which is part of God’s good 
creation. They are “between good and evil,”44 not in the sense that they 
are mid-way between both, but in the sense that their existence paradoxi-
cally seems to entail the co-existence of both. They are not “quite good,” 
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or “a bit evil.” There is no sum that could express the relative proportion 
of good to evil. Demons are “between good and evil” in the sense that 
they are a mixture of the two: they are a hybrid; neither one thing nor the 
other.45 In this theology, evil is evil precisely because it is a denial, con-
tradiction or rejection of the good—not because it is the use of a neutral 
capacity for good instead of evil.46
In the following parts of this paper, more evidence will be examined to 
support the claim that demons are liminal, in-between, or hybrid beings 
and that this is a credible construal of the Cappadocians’ theology. Here it 
is worth noting that the idea of the demons’ paradoxical existence between 
good and evil resonates with (and perhaps further elucidates) some claims 
made by Dale Martin in his book Inventing Superstition.47 Martin argues 
that in late antiquity Christianity developed a conception of demons that 
was different from both popular pagan religion and earlier philosophi-
cal paganism. He begins by tracing one pagan philosophical trajectory of 
thought according to which δαιμόνες were thought to be divine, superior 
to humanity, and incapable of anything truly evil. Apparent malevolence 
was to be explained in various ways all of which rested on the fundamen-
tal conception of an ordered universe.48 This trajectory existed along-
side a more popular worldview in which δαιμόνες were believed—like 
humans—to be variously benevolent and malevolent.49 Popular religion, 
which held that the δαιμόνες should be feared and appeased, was regularly 
condemned by philosophers as δεισδαιμονία or superstitio—“superstition” 
here relating not to an irrational belief in the supernatural (for Martin 
rightly argues such a concept is anachronistic), but to an irrational failure 
to accept the fundamental harmony of the cosmos. On this account, the 
popular fear of demons is explained by philosophical writers as a failure 
to see the bigger picture: apparent harm is in fact explainable in terms of 
the good of the whole.50
In late antiquity, however, this picture became more complex, and Martin 
uses the example of Porphyry and Iamblichus as evidence of philosophers 
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who believed in δαιμόνες, both beneficent and malevolent.51 Christians, on 
the other hand, seemed to accept the belief in demons, but Martin argues 
they added a novel element: the notion of δαιμόνες being “completely evil.” 
He asserts that in late antique Christianity, besides God and his angels 
“there is also evil directly attributable to an entire force of the universe in 
temporary opposition to God—daimons and those under their influence. 
Daimons, which include the gods of the nations, are completely evil; they 
are fallen angels exercising their wills against God. Christians must choose 
either the perfection of the latter or the destruction of the former.”52 It is 
not just the case that all demons are evil, but that they are all completely 
evil: they do not waver between beneficence and malevolence as do Por-
phyry and Iamblichus’s δαιμόνες.53 
Martin’s discussion of Christianity focuses on Origen and Eusebius of 
Caesarea. Our reading of Cappadocian cosmology above complements 
his account, but offers an opportunity to spell out what it might mean 
to assert that, for Christians in late antiquity, demons were “completely 
evil.” As Martin argues, in late antiquity there were (at least) two ways 
of measuring individuals against one another: there was an ontological 
scale and an ethical scale.54 Philosophical pagans (especially those from 
the Platonic and Peripatetic schools) tended to assume that a being high 
up on the ontological scale was also high on the ethical scale: for example, 
the more divine you were, the more supremely good and the more real 
you were. Those at the top of the scale also tended to be immaterial (or 
more immaterial), more rational, and more powerful. Christianity upset 
this parallel arrangement of the two scales, by arguing that there were 
beings who were “completely evil” (that is, at the bottom of the ethical 
scale), while at the same time being ontologically superior to humans. 
“Ontologically superior” here seems to mean more powerful and being 
composed of a finer substance, but Martin seems particularly concerned 
with the notion of the demons’ power.55
Martin is right, I think, to argue that the Christians’ concept of demons 
created a tension between ontological superiority and moral inferiority; 
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this is a fruitful way of helping one to understand Christians’ complex 
attitudes to demons, as it highlights the point that there is something 
inherently paradoxical about demonic existence. What I would add to 
Martin’s account, however, is the point that, according to the logic of the 
Cappadocians’ theology, demons were also good to the extent that they 
were superior ontological beings (rational, powerful, etc.). Consequently, 
to say that demons are completely or purely evil is a judgment on their 
wills that are utterly opposed to God, but not a judgment on their fun-
damental make-up or nature. In other words, the tension is perhaps even 
more profound than Martin’s description suggests. The concept of good-
ness applied to demons ontologically is not that which describes their 
moral choices (which are always evil), but derives from the Cappadocian 
doctrine of creation: anything that exists is good, in that it was created 
by God. This goodness of creation is particularly evident in the power, 
rationality, and fine constitution of the angels (including those who fell).56
From a modern perspective in which “good” is used primarily to describe 
ethical choices, it is perhaps odd to distinguish between ontological and 
ethical goodness, but understanding such a distinction is necessary in order 
to make the tensions in the Cappadocian notion of demons fully appar-
ent.57 Not only are the Cappadocians saying that demons have wills that 
are completely opposed to God and more powerful, with a finer substance 
than humans’ (Martin’s point), they are also saying that demons are evil 
(as to their completely habituated use of their wills against God) and pos-
sess a good created nature. On this account, the fact that they are so evil 
is not just in tension with their superior nature, but it contradicts it: they 
are a living paradox. Their state excites moral outrage and fear precisely 
because their use of their wills for evil contradicts the sheer goodness of 
their original state and the potential of their natural state for the good.
Another way to put this is that the Cappadocians’ theory of evil illus-
trates a move in late antiquity (which Martin documents) from what one 
might call a quantitative to a qualitative, or relational, concept of good 
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and evil. A being is no longer good/evil according to its distance from the 
divine, but according to its acceptance or rejection of its creator (a point 
Martin expresses with his notion of the ethical). But a being is also good 
in its relationship to the divine by virtue of its creation: it is good as to its 
ontology (a point which I have suggested can deepen the paradox Martin 
identifies still further). Even though a rational being might reject its creator 
with its will, it remains related to God ontologically because, in Cappa-
docian theology, God remains eternally lord of the entire created world.
In sum, the Cappadocians seem to think that demons are not “com-
pletely evil” ontologically speaking, because as created beings they are 
by definition good and because evil is parasitic on or a privation of the 
good. Demons are, however, held to be “completely evil” in the sense that 
they have wills that are completely opposed to God (and this seems to be 
the sense in which Martin uses the expression “completely evil”).58 This 
opposition to God makes demons dangerous. Furthermore, their supe-
rior power and their peculiar constitution (being material but invisible) 
means that they are peculiarly able to draw humans away from God as the 
demons plummet on their downward trajectory. Thus, as I will argue in 
more detail below, for the Cappadocians demons are not just a source of 
what one might call cosmic danger (κακοδαιμονία, e.g., unexpected death, 
disease, famine, or earthquake), they are also a source of moral danger 
through their working on human minds.59 
There might be a further sense in which demons were thought to be 
“completely evil”: that is, the idea that they are irreversibly evil and irre-
deemable, a characteristic that increases the danger they pose to humans.60 
As I have suggested above, in my comments about eschatology, this is an 
idea that appears to have been held by Basil, but denied by his brother, 
Gregory of Nyssa. For Basil, the paradox between the demons’ natures 
(created good) and their wills (fixated on evil) remains in eternity—even 
though God appears to utilize it for his own ends to punish humans. For 
Gregory, it seems, the paradox is unsustainable eschatologically, for he 
clearly seems to suggest that, in the end, all rational beings will be saved, 
precisely because God will be able to purify their good natures of the 
indwelling and corrupting impurities, however severe they are.61
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DEMONS AND PERSONAL TEMPTATION
The Cappadocians’ response to the current presence of evil in the world 
was often not theoretical (a theodicy), but intensely practical. This theme 
is particularly prominent in Basil, whose oeuvre contains a large number 
of pastoral and ascetic writings (including, for example, pastoral comments 
in his letters and sermons). While firmly emphasizing that the devil and 
his demons are part of God’s creation, Basil develops the ancient theme of 
the “two ways”: in the present era, good things come from God and bad 
things—especially the temptation to sin—from demons.62 This idea of the 
two ways is developed in different ways, some more abstract, others more 
figurative. Sometimes Basil psychologizes the two ways, so that they are 
envisaged as two faculties or powers (δυνάμεις), “the one wicked, which 
is of the demons, drawing us along to their own apostasy, the other more 
divine and good, leading us up to the likeness of God.”63 At other times, 
the “two ways” are pictured as two paths, one broad, one narrow, each 
with its own guide, “a wicked demon” or “a good angel”:
There are two ways opposed to each other, the one wide and broad, the 
other narrow and close. And there are two guides, each attempting to turn 
the traveler to himself. Now, the smooth and downward sloping way has a 
deceptive guide, a wicked demon, who drags his followers through pleasure 
to destruction, but the rough and steep way has a good angel, who leads his 
followers through the toils of virtue to a blessed end.64
Humans are led along “the smooth and downward sloping way”65 through 
being tempted towards passion. The Cappadocians’ writings offer evidence 
that Christians thought that the choice between the two paths was most 
urgent at the moment of death: Gregory of Nyssa’s account of Macrina’s 
death-bed prayer perhaps alludes to this belief (she prays that an angel 
of light will lead her to a place of refreshment and that the “jealous one” 
should not bar her way). So also, perhaps, does Nazianzen’s prayer that 
an angel of light (and thus not a demon) should “snatch” his deceased 
mother Nonna to safety.66
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This idea of the two ways and their corresponding guides or powers 
(guardian angels and demons) might, on a superficial reading, seem to 
imply that there was a rival cosmic power on the same level with God. 
That this is not the case for Basil and the other two Cappadocians has 
become evident from the survey of their cosmology above: God is held to 
be the sole creative power and the creator of the devil and his demons. It 
is because God has allowed them temporarily to employ their power in the 
world that humans have the choice between these two ways. Dale Mar-
tin helpfully suggests there is a model of patronage at work in this kind 
of idea: in this Christian view of the cosmos, there are temporarily two 
cosmic powers and all humans must choose one as their patron. Indeed, 
Martin argues that Christianity’s success was bound up with its offer of 
a patron who would protect his clients against the ravages of the rival 
power.67 This idea seems particularly prominent in the writings of Basil.68
It must be admitted, however, that much of the use of this theme of the 
two ways is fairly conventional and it is difficult to extract from it a clear 
doctrine of the role of demons. More promising is literature explicitly 
dealing with the moral life. Although the demons’ “art” (διδασκάλιον) of 
vice finds plenty of variety,69 the Cappadocians associate it especially with 
three vices: deceit, envy, and anger.
The emphasis on deceit is evident from early Christians’ interpretation 
of the Bible: in their view it was Satan who lied to Eve, and his promises 
to Jesus were specious as well. But Basil also warns—in a nice example 
of the “patron” model—that in the present age the devil “deceives the 
victims of his plots into thinking that they should flee to him as protec-
tor,” when in fact what all demons want is “our destruction.”70 Gregory 
of Nyssa clearly states that demonic forces bend humans to their will by 
making evil things seem good so that they are freely chosen.71 Indeed, he 
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argues, demons work generally by persuading humans to make superficial 
judgments: by teaching humans to rely merely on evidence that lies on 
the surface, the demon in fact prevents humans from properly employ-
ing their freedom of choice.72 Gregory of Nazianzus seems to have a very 
similar notion of the cognitive effects of demonic power: “Demons tricked 
a human being to search for divinity precipitously and incorrectly. They 
offered a light ‘deceitful and meddling . . . quite contrary to the true light, 
though pretending to be that light, that it may cheat us by its appearance 
(τῷ φαινομένῳ).’”73
With regard to the second vice, envy, Gregory of Nazianzus reports that 
it was this that caused Satan’s fall:
First of all Lucifer, raised on high (for he aspired to the royal honor of the 
mighty God, though already granted outstanding glory), lost his radiant 
splendor and fell to dishonor in this world, becoming total darkness in the 
face of God (ὅλον σκότος ἀντὶ Θεοῖο). Although of light composition, he yet 
slipped to this lower earth, from where he displays his hatred against the 
wise and, fired by anger at his own ruin, tries to turn all others from the 
path which leads to heaven. He has no wish that the beings fashioned by 
God should approach the place from where he fell. He conceived a desire to 
share with mortals the darkness of his sin. Therefore, the envious one cast 
out of paradise also the beings who sought glory equal to God’s.74
While Nazianzen suggests that the devil fears that humans will in the future 
succeed in rising while he failed, Nyssen implies that the demons’ assaults 
on humans are provoked by what they see as the special favors already 
given by God to human nature.75 Basil argues that envy was the specific 
means by which the devil carries out his warfare on humanity: being unable 
to fight with his own resources, it consistently co-opts human beings into 
carrying out its evil intentions.76 The demons who discovered envy, pass 
on their discovery (εὕρημα) to humans and thus in effect enroll them into 
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their army.77 Basil implies that humans have a choice to give way to envy 
or not, but he is also aware, from a pastoral perspective, that some people 
become so enslaved by passions like envy that they unwittingly become the 
dupes of demons.78 Thus while the Cappadocians use this Christian story 
about an original envy to keep alive or perhaps to transform the com-
mon belief that misfortune is caused by spirits that envy someone’s previ-
ous good luck, they also treat the vice of envy as a serious moral danger, 
originating from the devil, but infecting humankind. It must be resisted.79
Anger, the third key vice, seems to be associated with demons partly 
because, as both Gregory of Nyssa and Basil remark, someone who is in 
thrall to rage looks as if he is demon-possessed: “do you see how the symp-
toms of demon-possession are manifested in those in a grip of rage?”80 
Gregory’s description suggests a comparison with someone afflicted by 
epilepsy (the “demonic disease”): whether he thinks that the disease is 
directly caused by a demon or not, he carefully notes that someone who 
is ill is an unwilling victim of his uncontrollable and violent bodily move-
ments and is thus deserving only of pity. People who are angry, however, 
even though they have been attacked by the “demon of rage” (ὁ δὲ τοῦ 
θυμοῦ δαίμων), are complicit with the demon: they allow themselves to 
become angry; it is a “voluntary evil”; they willingly imitate and aim to 
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surpass the anger of the one with whom they are arguing.81 Even though 
Basil uses the language of anger entering one’s soul and of anger over-
coming one, he is clear that the angry person is ultimately responsible for 
giving way to it.82
All three vices exemplify the quality that the Cappadocians see as epito-
mizing what is wrong with demons’ relationship with humans: their skill at 
a kind of false mimicry.83 Their deception of humans involves them mim-
icking the truly good by showing humans something whose goodness is 
only skin-deep; envy encourages humans to aspire to be something which 
they are not and cannot be; anger causes them to imitate and replicate the 
anger of an opponent even when there is no rational cause. This kind of 
mimicry, the bringing about of something that simultaneously is and is not 
what it seems to be, typifies the liminal or hybrid state in which demons 
are thought to dwell: just as demons epitomize the evil use of something 
good and thus sit uncomfortably in between good and evil, so things both 
are and are not the way that the demons claim them to be. One might be 
tempted to say that demons makes things appear one way, when actually 
they are another, but the situation is perhaps a little more complex. If, in 
ancient ethics (especially Aristotelian ethics) something is good accord-
ing to its context, it is possible that something could be good in one con-
text, but not in another. The demons’ deception thus lies not in making 
something that is obviously bad obviously good, but in confusing human 
minds about the context: is this the kind of context that makes this kind 
of action a good or a bad one?
The examples of envy and anger might also suggest that the Cappado-
cians’ belief that such passions were caused by a demon placed passions 
on the boundary between one’s self and the “other.” The psychological 
fact that the onset of a passion was often experienced as coming from 
outside, together with the fact that the Gospels depicted Satan tempting 
Christ, allowed monks to understand temptation as a universal human 
experience. This helped them avoid extreme self-denigration. Further-
more, the (not necessarily self-conscious) process of externalizing pas-
sions by personifying them as demons helped monks to develop strategies 
for countering them.84 On the other hand, the recognition that one either 
could or could not give way to passion/a demon and let it take root in 
one’s soul still left room for moral responsibility. Believing a passion to 
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be a demon did not absolve one from blame if one gave in to it; rather it 
provided one with an enemy to face and counter-attack. Basil describes 
the interplay between human moral vulnerability and responsibility when 
he reports the way in which anger is experienced as “attacking us from 
without.”85 Demons “make . . . the eyes of envious persons serviceable to 
their own purposes”; so, Basil counsels, use reason to curb anger before 
it gets a hold; refrain from capitulating to envy lest one “makes oneself a 
tool for the dread demon.”86 He is impatient with excuses: someone who 
blames his rage on the person who provoked him is no less contemptible 
than “an adulterer who passes on the blame to his mistress, alleging that 
she led him into sin.”87
Thus Basil and indeed the other Cappadocians portray demons as “wag-
ing furious war on humanity”—a war from outside that must be resisted 
by reason. However, they also picture passions as arising from within a 
person’s own soul and for this they use the language of demons taking up 
residence there: a demon can be “an inhabitant” (ἔνοικος) of one’s soul, 
a demonic “flat-mate” (συνοίκος) of one’s own self.88 Demons can even 
be brought to birth, alien-like, within us.89 These very physical picturings 
of demonic possession remind the reader of the ever-present danger of 
demons—the way they operate is more like a fifth columnist, rather than 
an attack on an open front. Nevertheless, even this more insidious form 
of attack does not absolve people from blame: they simply need to be very 
aware of their vulnerability.
Another theological resonance of the Cappadocians’ language about 
indwelling demons is the way in which they either implicitly or explic-
itly set it against the idea of divine indwelling. For example, Gregory of 
Nazianzus writes,
if [the devil] finds in you a place [the soul], swept and garnished indeed, but 
empty and idle, equally ready to take in the one or the other (τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε) 
who shall first occupy it, he makes a leap into it, he takes up his abode 
there (εἰσῳκίσθη). . . . And therefore the possession (ἡ κατάσχεσις) is more 
secure to him who dwells there (τῷ οἰκήτορι).90
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Here Gregory seems to be creatively drawing not only on the common 
notion of demonic possession, but also on the Pauline idea of being a 
temple in which God can dwell (see 2 Cor 6.16: “What agreement has the 
temple of God with idols [εἰδῶλων]? For we are the temple [ναὸς] of the 
living God; as God said, ‘I will live in them [ἐνοικήσω] and walk among 
them, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people.’”).91 Gregory 
implies, therefore, that either God or the devil (τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε) can dwell 
in someone. A similar idea is expressed in Gregory of Nyssa’s Homilies 
on the Song of Songs, in which Solomon is a type of Christ: “If you had 
once been the ‘tents of Kedar’ because the ruler of the powers of darkness 
dwelt in you (τοῦ ἐνοικῆσαι ὑμῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ σκότους) . . . 
you will become the ‘curtains of Solomon,’ that is, you will become the 
King’s temple (ναὸς) with King Solomon dwelling (ἐνοικήσαντος) in you.”92
The fact that demons are able to attack humans both from inside and 
outside furthermore suggests that they have a peculiar constitution: they 
have material bodies, but of such a fine “stuff” that they are invisible and 
can easily inhabit other bodies, whether human or animal or inanimate. 
The Cappadocians write little specifically about demons’ bodies, but their 
general discussion of the demonic seems to bear out the conclusions drawn 
by Gregory Smith who shows convincingly that demons were assumed 
to have bodies in late antiquity, although “few temptations have been as 
attractive (or productive) as the psychological interpretation of demons, 
especially Christian ones.”93 Rightly reminding us that “being invisible . . . 
is not the same as being immaterial,” Smith’s argument shows how the 
theory of a fine or special demonic body enabled writers to fit demons into 
a nexus of medical, psychological, and spiritual explanations of human 
behavior.94 In other words, talk of demons was not (as a modern reader 
might assume) a last-ditch or non-philosophical recourse to supernatural 
causation that could explain the otherwise inexplicable; rather it was part 
of a “natural” explanation of things (or, better, an explanation in terms of 
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the created order).95 Furthermore, although, as I have shown, the Cappa-
docians do use the language of demons being “inside” and “outside” their 
victims, one should perhaps be a little wary of transposing our very clear 
modern conception of what is inside and outside the self to late antique 
concepts of the person. Rather than being an oddity or a challenge to a 
Christian sense of a clear boundary between one’s self and everything which 
is external to oneself, perhaps Cappadocian conceptions of the working 
of the demonic actually provide further evidence for a more “porous” 
concept of the self in this milieu.96 
Consequently, the belief that demons have bodies, but of a strange 
intangible kind, and the belief that they are both “inside” and “outside” 
humans, are both reflections of the Cappadocians’ beliefs about the decep-
tive liminality of the demonic: demons are created but sometimes behave 
and try to act as if they were not. This false and hopeless attempt to usurp 
divine privilege was the cause of their fall and, as we shall see, is the basis 
of their most wide-ranging deception—pagan religion.
EXORCISM
Although the Cappadocians think that God has allowed demons a tempo-
rary continued ability to plague humans, these theologians also emphasize 
that demons can be resisted with God’s power. This power can become 
effective especially in those who fast and pray; it has its most dramatic 
effect in those who utter the name of Christ in exorcism.
Basil advises that fasting and prayer are effective against demons.97 
The Psalms too are a “citadel against the demons” (ψαλμὸς δαιμόνων 
φυγαδευτήριον), the recitation of Psalm 90, for example, having an 
almost amulet-like power to ward off the “noon-day demon” (δαιμονίου 
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μεσημβρινοῦ).98 Of similar power are baptism (more specifically the chrism 
given at baptism) and the sign of the cross.99 Of most potency, however is 
the name of Christ: on the lips of martyrs, it causes angels to rejoice, but 
“wounds” demons.100 
Human power over demons is used by the Cappadocians both as a 
sign of God’s lordship and as an indicator of an individual’s own spiritual 
character. Hence, the fact that Jesus casts out demons is proof of his full 
divinity: the Cappadocians stress that in exorcising he acts with the Father 
and the Spirit (who is therefore also fully divine).101 Saints who cast out 
demons, on the other hand, do so in the name of Christ or by the power 
of the Spirit: in hagiographical literature, demons are portrayed as obey-
ing the ministers of God. For example, Gregory of Nyssa depicts Gregory 
Thaumaturgus as having complete power over demons, the saint even 
on one occasion proving his point by commanding demons to re-enter a 
pagan shrine that he had just exorcised! In this case, surely recounted by 
Gregory with a smile, the Wonderworker demonstrated the extent of his 
authority to the stunned priest (who had himself just failed to make the 
demons re-enter the shrine) not by any elaborate theurgic ritual, but more 
prosaically by the writing of a note: “Gregory to Satan: enter!”102 Interest-
ingly, Gregory of Nyssa does not just attribute power to exorcise demons 
to the great saints of the past, but also to his siblings Macrina and Basil, 
although the low profile given to such exorcisms, may suggest a caution 
deriving from an anxiety not to be associated with Messalianism.103
These examples may help one to explain a little more carefully the way 
in which demons are temporarily both in and out of divine control. As we 
saw above, all three Cappadocians think that, eschatologically, demons 
will submit utterly to God; in the meantime, they, like humans, have been 
allowed some use of freedom and rationality. It seems, from the examples 
studied here, that it is when humans freely cooperate with the demons that 
the demons have temporary power in the world: in Basil’s words, “the 
demons . . . use for their own ends such free acts as they find congenial 
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to their wishes.”104 This is exemplified both in the private sphere—when 
someone allows himself to be taken over by envy or anger—and in the 
public sphere—when communities allow themselves to be deceived into 
the worship of demons. In both cases humans are deceived, but there is 
a strong presumption that they are culpable for, or implicated in, their 
own deception. The Cappadocians’ virtue ethic incorporates the idea that 
humans can compromise themselves morally in such a way that, in the long 
run, they find it almost impossible to resist evil/demons. Therefore, just 
as Aristotle’s drunk man is responsible for his unwitting actions because 
he allowed himself to get drunk, there seems to be an assumption in Cap-
padocian theology that humans have a duty, by working towards virtue, 
not to make themselves ready victims for the demons.105
Conversely, it is when humans freely cooperate with God that the divine 
power is able to prevail. This is illustrated most dramatically in the case 
of exorcism, where it is God’s power that defeats the demon but always 
through some kind of human agency, even the minimal act of uttering the 
name of Christ. But it is also evident in the moral sphere, when Christians 
are urged to pray and ask for God’s grace, or warned not to be taken in by 
heretics: none of these injunctions make sense without the sophisticated 
notion of humans working with God (συνεργεία), which is a hallmark of 
Cappadocian theology.106 To this extent, then, humans do have a choice 
between God and demons: for the Cappadocians it is a choice not only of 
which patron one should submit to or obey, but also, in a more profound 
sense, of which power one allows to work through one. Thus stories of 
exorcism are used by the Cappadocians as an expression of the kind of 
theodicy we noted above: even though one cannot explain why demons 
have been given room for maneuver, one can draw from the stories assur-
ance that God (through his agents) is ultimately master over them. Stories 
of saints like Gregory Thaumaturgus are not just stories about the past, 
but pointers towards an eschatological victory still to come. However, the 
stories also call the audience to participate in God’s work and to resist the 
work of the demons in their own small, personal way: there is a strong 
ethical as well as eschatological dimension to them.
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Finally, examples of exorcism are used by the Cappadocians not only to 
say something about divine power and human agency, but also to illustrate 
a further paradox: despite being masters of deception, demons know the 
truth about God. Thus Gregory of Nazianzus states that “the demons knew 
that he who drove them out was God, for they were persuaded by their 
own experience,” and Gregory of Nyssa cites the case of Legion (Mark 5, 
Luke 8) to show that “the voice of the demons says, ‘We know who you 
are, the holy one of God.’”107 Basil declares against Eunomius that even 
“the devils themselves do not deny that God exists.”108 The case of exor-
cism thus illustrates my earlier argument. To know God, one must have 
a faculty that in some ways functions properly: it cannot be completely 
evil. Inasmuch as it allows the demon to know God, it is functioning as 
God intended it, as a well operating (albeit in a limited way) part of God’s 
good creation.109 So the fact that demons know that God alone is God, yet 
choose to deceive humans as to that fact, is a further example of demons’ 
liminal position in Cappadocian theology: demons are not completely evil 
in an ontological sense, but are certainly working in complete opposition 
to God. Ethically, then, one would want to say they are completely evil. 
But this has personal as well as cosmological implications. Since the Cap-
padocians emphasize that a rational being could know God and yet refuse 
to worship him, stories of demons are used by the Cappadocians to draw 
humans’ attention to the real possibility and danger of falling, especially, 
perhaps, for those who thought they were safe. Thus when their cosmol-
ogy grapples with the idea that a perfect being might fall, it is directly 
connected to the problems of sin in everyday life: “I fear to ascribe sin to 
the attendants of the pure one who rules on high, them who are a form 
of being sated with light, in case I should somehow pave a way to evil for 
still more beings.”110
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DEMONS AND “PAGAN RELIGION”111
The important role that demons play in Cappadocian theology can be 
seen not only in their concept of the history of salvation (a cosmologi-
cal perspective) and their reflections on vice and temptation (generally, a 
personal or private perspective), but also in their comments on paganism 
(what one could see as a public or political perspective). Above we dis-
cussed the question of why God allowed demons to continue to act after 
Jesus’ crucifixion and resurrection. In the public sphere, however, the 
same general question finds a more precise focus: the issue of why God 
allowed demons to continue to act was connected to the question of why 
God allowed the continuation of pagan religious practices.
The identification of pagan gods with demons picks up a theme used 
by earlier Christian writers, such as Justin Martyr and Origen.112 The 
Cappadocians justify the equation in several ways. First, as Gregory of 
Nazianzus points out, the pagans frequently referred to their own gods as 
daimones.113 Second, the Cappadocians cite Ps 95.5 (LXX): “all the gods 
of the nations are demons” (πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν δαιμόνια). They gloss 
this verse by asserting that demons have fooled human beings not only 
into serving them, but also into calling them “gods” when they are nei-
ther God nor his agents.114 In particular, the Cappadocians associate this 
demonic deception with idolatry.115 The problem is, as Basil puts it bluntly, 
that “whenever [the mind] yields to those who deceive it [i.e. the δαιμόνες], 
having obscured its own judgment, it becomes involved in strange fancies. 
Then it even thinks that wood is not wood but God; and it considers that 
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gold is not money but an object of worship.”116 Even worse is the asso-
ciation of idol-worship with the offering of sacrifice. Gregory of Nyssa 
asks, “For who is there that does not know that every part of the world 
was overspread with demoniacal delusion, which mastered the life of man 
through the madness of idolatry; how this was the customary rule among 
all nations, to worship demons under the form of idols, with the sacrifice 
of living animals and the polluted offerings on their altars?”117 The Cap-
padocians were also concerned with the place of augury in Roman religion. 
Gregory of Nyssa is typical in explicitly claiming that all the means by 
which certain persons claim to predict the future—“through divination by 
the examination of livers, or by watching the flight of birds, through omens, 
through the summoning of ghosts, through astrology”—all these are decep-
tions controlled by demons.118 This argument is crucial to understanding 
Christian attitudes to pagan religious practices in late antiquity: they do 
not pursue a reductionist argument that, because “wood is wood,” pagan 
worship involves nothing beyond the visible. Rather, the Cappadocians 
argue that pagans worship spiritual beings, but that they misidentify who 
they are (thinking they are gods, not demons) and incorrectly assume they 
are permanently located in, or associated with, certain material objects. 
Pagan religious practices are either totally unreliable or appear to “work” 
because the demons respond to theurgy and allow priests to predict the 
future frequently enough in order to make their general deception cred-
ible.119 Once again, then, we find the notion of a deceptive mimicry: the 
demons pretend to be divine when they are not and pretend to offer their 
devotees good when all they can give is evil.
The Cappadocians provide several vivid warnings against trusting the 
demons’ apparent beneficence. Gregory of Nyssa’s encomium on Gregory 
Thaumaturgus gives dramatic narrative form to the warning that if demons 
respond to prayers, it is not to a good end. Nyssen describes how, at a 
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feast in honor of a “local demon” (δαίμονί τινι τῶν ἐγχωρίων), virtually the 
whole population gathered in the city’s theatre for a celebration involving 
a play.120 So great was the crowd jostling for the best view that the actors 
were inaudible and the whole production was halted. In exasperation a 
general cry went up from the crowd: “Zeus, give us more room!” Greg-
ory Thaumaturgus immediately dispatched one of his disciples, warning 
them that they did not know what they were asking for—but to no avail, 
for soon the city was engulfed by a terrible plague that created plenty of 
space in the city, by decimating the population.121 Gregory of Nyssa thus 
implicitly contrasts the pagan “gods” who gave people what they want, 
even if it is bad for them, with the Christian God who will not give people 
what they ask for if it is harmful.122
While demons are connected with pagan religion primarily in terms of 
this kind of deceit, the Cappadocians also use the well-worn Christian 
argument that, as Nazianzen puts it, “the ‘gods’ and ‘demons’ (as they 
themselves style them) . . . stand convicted by their own theologians of 
being affected by evil emotions, of being quarrelsome, of being brimful 
of mischief in all its varieties.”123 In other words, the traditional myths as 
recounted by “theologians” such as Homer and Hesiod depict the “gods” 
as instantiating the passions with which—as we saw in the previous sec-
tion—Christians thought demons tempted humans.
The Cappadocians frequently connect pagan gods not only with vice but 
with a mixed or hybrid nature and they refer to pagan beliefs and practices 
to reiterate this point. Thus Gregory of Nyssa, for example, distinguishes 
the Christian Son of God from pagan divinities in that Christians hold 
that the Son is, rather than merely participates in, the divine. In one of his 
books against Eunomius, Gregory writes,
So it is that those who string together myths in verse depict people such 
as Dionysius, Heracles, Minos and others like them from the bonding of 
spirits with human bodies, and elevate such people above the rest of men 
by reason of the superiority which comes from participation [metousia] in 
the higher nature. This word [metousia] therefore should be passed over in 
silence, as originally a proof of folly and impiety.124
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Gregory’s argument here has several strands. First, he asserts that a hero 
like Hercules is at most only half-human and half-divine, even according 
to the claims of the poets who praise him. Second, since there can be no 
degrees of divinity in Christian theology (one of the overarching themes 
of Against Eunomius), Hercules is, in fact, not divine at all, but a created 
demon. Thus, the poets’ stories of hybrid demi-gods fall short of the truth 
(for Christians, there can be no such thing as a demi-god), yet nevertheless 
do reflect something of demons’ hybrid or in-between nature. Thus Greg-
ory certainly thinks that the myths reflect the idea that demons occupy an 
odd, “in-between” cosmological space, as we saw illustrated above. Not 
only are they “between good and evil,” but also they act as if they were 
god(s), when they are not.125
Gregory of Nyssa claims that the demons’/pagan gods’ nature is illus-
trated not only by stories of couplings between gods and humans, but also 
by tales and artistic representations of strange animal-human hybrids. He 
draws attention, for example, to the bizarre paintings and sculptures of 
Egyptian religion:
They say that their fantastic mode of compounding their idols, when 
they adapt the forms of certain irrational animals to human limbs, is an 
enigmatic symbol of that mixed nature which they call “daemon,” and that 
this is more subtle than that of men, and far surpasses our nature in power, 
but has the divine element in it not unmingled or uncompounded, but is 
combined with the nature of the soul and the perceptions of the body, and 
is receptive of pleasure and pain.126
Again, this argument is more complex than it might at first seem. Gregory 
here repeats the idea that the representations of the gods, although essen-
tially false, do at least contain a grain of truth in revealing the objects of 
pagan worship as having a nature that is in between or hybrid—that is, 
in his terms, demonic. But his reference to an “enigmatic symbol” might 
refer specifically to the kind of philosophical justifications of polytheistic 
religious practice found in writers such as Iamblichus, who rejected any 
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simplistic equation of material images with the divine, but argued for their 
vital role in ceremony as symbols of, or objects that could be infused with, 
the divine.127 If this is so, Gregory’s response is noteworthy. He does not 
argue that the Egyptian idols are mere matter, empty of any power or sig-
nification. Rather, he agrees that they do symbolize something (and else-
where implies demons can indwell temples, if not idols),128 but radically 
disagrees with Iamblichus on the question of whether the beings that the 
images symbolize are worthy of veneration.
Finally, Gregory of Nyssa comments not only on the compound nature 
of pagan δαιμόνες, but also on their plurality: when deceptive δαιμόνες 
presented themselves in various visible forms, he asserts, the Egyptians 
reckoned each form to be a separate god.129 Gregory actually defines 
pagan superstition (δεισδαιμονία) as the worship of many gods/δαιμόνες (as 
opposed to atheism, which is the worship of none).130 The Cappadocians 
play on the common Greek cultural association of plurality with imper-
fection when they write about pagan religion, for instance complaining 
that pagan religious practices derive from very many different ethnic and 
geographic roots (so they are not even truly “Greek” or “Roman”).131 
Furthermore, the error of a plurality of gods is taken to lead inevitably 
to plurality of opinion: “The difficulty is that the pagans hold radically 
opposed views on the same subjects, like children playing in the market-
place or men who are really possessed by evil spirits (ἢ ἀνδρῶν κακοδαιμόνων 
ὡς ἀληθῶς)—not like people who are in conversation with men of reason, 
worshippers of the Word.”132 The dissension among worshippers  implicitly 
matches the “quarrelsome” nature of the gods themselves, which was 
noted above. In a more humorous vein, Gregory of Nyssa ridicules birth 
myths about gods by comparing the parent god to a sow who farrows 
multiple piglets.133 Such comments often function at a rhetorical rather 
than a philosophical level, not least because the Cappadocians want to 
avoid condemning multiplicity per se, because as Christians they regard 
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the visible, multiple, material world as good. Nevertheless, they do seem to 
express the idea that the plural is not worthy of worship. They are careful 
to construe their doctrine of the Trinity in such a way as to avoid the idea 
that Father, Son, and Spirit can be counted in the way that three created 
objects could be counted.134 Similarly, they want to avoid the idea that 
the three persons mediated between the pure, single nature of the divine 
and the multiplicity of the world in a way not altogether different from 
the way in which some devout pagan philosophers regarded the gods as 
mediations between the world and a single divine principle. This may be 
why, in his poem on demons, Gregory of Nazianzus is emphatic that the 
God he worships is “one.”135
Thus, in claiming that “all the gods of the nations are demons,” the Cap-
padocians are able to pursue three main lines of argument. First, they claim 
that demons are deceptive, for they claim to be gods (or at least, worthy 
of worship) when they are not and they promise benefits to their devo-
tees that they do not deliver. Second, demons are not only deceptive, but 
viciously passionate—another reason why they are unworthy of worship. 
Third, although the more sophisticated accounts of polytheistic religion 
argue that the material objects used in worship are symbols of something 
other than themselves, Gregory of Nyssa asserts that really this symbolic 
representation reveals the pagan gods or δαιμόνες for what they really are: 
created, mutable, hybrid, in between heaven and earth, plural, and causing 
division. Far from attacking polytheism by denying the existence of any 
invisible being other than God, the Cappadocians attack it by admitting 
the existence of such beings, but denying they are worthy of worship.136
Naturally, the construction of the category of the demonic as hybrid, 
deceptive, and dangerously liminal, served a very useful purpose for the 
Cappadocian fathers: they were able to use this category in quite a sophis-
ticated way against their theological enemies (both Christian and not) to 
accuse them of spreading not only error, but confusion, deception, divi-
sion, and danger. Although one can detect a sophisticated rhetorical strat-
egy here, it is important not to regard the identification of paganism with 
the demonic as mere rhetoric. Given the arguments that I have outlined 
above, it is reasonable to assume that a belief in demons was not just use-
ful but vital for the Cappadocians’ attack on contemporary pagan religion.
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CONCLUSION
This outline of demons’ place in Cappadocian theology indicates, I sug-
gest, several reasons why demons were so feared and why they were such 
a powerful tool in Christian discourse. First, reminders of their original 
angelic nature with its rationality and fine substance stressed demons’ 
power: they were not just evil, but influentially and dangerously so. Sec-
ond, their paradoxical nature, in which evil came to exist even in what 
was truly good, illustrates the sheer offense of the nature of evil itself: the 
choice of evil was seen not as a choice of one of two things of the same 
kind, but as the abnegation of a pre-existing good, which continued to 
exist even in the face of its rejection. Demons were evil because they were 
the most excellent part of rational creation and fell, and yet they remained 
part of rational creation. Third, the demons’ liminal position in this respect 
reflected the dangers of human existence. The Cappadocians, like other 
Christians, believed that the current state of human existence contradicted 
their original creation and that henceforth humankind existed as a tension 
between good and evil. The drama of the demons’ creation and fall, there-
fore, showed that they were to be feared not just because they were power-
ful, but precisely because their predicament was an exaggerated version of 
humans’ own (although unlike the heroes of a tragic drama, they were fully 
responsible for their freely-chosen fate). In preaching, then, demons served 
as a warning, because their situation—being rational creatures who were 
locked into a habit of evil choices and who were yet given the freedom to 
carry those choices out—signaled the possibility that humans too could 
lock themselves into their own lives of sin. Finally, the demons’ actions 
as well as their nature were hybrid and again this fact was taken to be an 
exaggerated reflection of the possibilities of human behavior, both public 
and private, individual and corporate: in Cappadocian pastoral theology 
it seems that the most acute moral danger was something that masked 
evil behind an apparent good, that falsely mimicked the good, that arose 
when a good thing was done for an evil end. They thought that the dan-
ger of evil was most potent when evil was mixed with good. This did not 
produce a fifty-fifty blend of mediocrity, but an outrage: the continued 
presence of evil within the good. For the Cappadocians, demons and their 
works were a vivid reminder of this fact.
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